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Abstract
We develop a revealed preference approach to analyze non-unitary con-
sumption models with intrahousehold allocations deviating from the cooper-
ative (or Pareto e¢ cient) solution. At a theoretical level, we establish re-
vealed preference conditions of household consumption models with varying
degrees of cooperation. Using these conditions, we show independence (or
non-nestedness) of the di¤erent (cooperative-noncooperative) models. At a
practical level, we show that our characterization implies testable conditions
for a whole spectrum of cooperative-noncooperative models that can be veried
by means of mixed integer programming (MIP) methods. This MIP formula-
tion is particularly attractive in view of empirical analysis. An application to
data drawn from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) demon-
strates the empirical relevance of consumption models that account for limited
intrahousehold cooperation.
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1 Introduction
We present a nonparametric revealed preference characterization of non-unitary
household consumption models that are identied by varying degrees of coopera-
tion. This characterization allows us to develop a practical method for analyzing a
whole spectrum of noncooperative-cooperative consumption models. In addition, it
enables us to derive some interesting theoretical results, such as independence (or
non-nestedness) of consumption models with di¤erent degrees of cooperation. We
use our method to analyze household consumption data taken from the Russia Lon-
gitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst
empirical application of consumption models that account for household behavior
that is not fully cooperative. This introductory section motivates our main research
questions, and relates them to the existing literature.
Non-unitary household consumption and cooperation. There is a growing
consensus that multi-person household consumption behavior should no longer be
treated as if it the household were a single decision maker that optimizes a household
utility function subject to the household budget constraint. Indeed, this so-called
unitary model of household consumption imposes empirically testable restrictions on
the household demand function (e.g. Slutsky symmetry) that are frequently rejected
when confronted with consumption or labor supply data of multi-person households.
See, for example, Fortin and Lacroix (1997), Browning and Chiappori (1998) and
Cherchye and Vermeulen (2008).
Because of these empirical problems of the unitary model, an emerging literature
explicitly acknowledges that households are composed of distinct individuals who are
endowed with their own preferences, and that household consumption decisions are
determined by an underlying intrahousehold decision mechanism. We refer to this
approach as the non-unitary approach to household consumption. Typically, non-
unitary consumption models allow for privately consumed goods as well as publicly
consumed goods within the household. In addition, following Apps and Rees (1988)
and Chiappori (1988, 1992), the usual assumption is that household allocations are
Pareto e¢ cient; in the household consumption literature, Pareto e¢ ciency corre-
sponds to the so-called cooperative within-household solution of the intrahousehold
allocation problem.1 However, the Pareto e¢ ciency assumption has been questioned
for the publicly consumed goods. Most notably, it has been argued that the informa-
tional requirement and the resulting cost of implementing cooperation may often be
unrealistic. See, for example, Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2007) and Lechene
and Preston (2005, 2008).
In this paper we develop a framework for distinguishing between di¤erent non-
1Following Chiappori (1988, 1992), the consumption literature often refers to the cooperative
model as the collectivemodel of household behavior.
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unitary consumption models in terms of the degree of cooperation. At this point,
it is worth noting that we see at least two reasons why it is important to know the
magnitude of intrahousehold cooperation. First, from a welfarist perspective, it gives
an idea of the welfare improvement that is possible within a certain household. If
it is possible to link the level of cooperation to household characteristics, it may be
possible to use this knowledge for welfare enhancement measures that correct the e¢ -
ciency loss originating from household behavior that is not fully cooperative. Second,
the issue has also important implications for the structure of optimal taxation and
policies that target to alter the intrahousehold income distribution. See, for exam-
ple, Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005) for a discussion on such targeting issues
in a non-unitary setting. In this respect, di¤erent (cooperative-noncooperative) con-
sumption models may lead to other intrahousehold allocations. In fact, the literature
has revealed a need for non-unitary household consumption models situated between
a fully cooperative case and a fully noncooperative situation, in order to obtain a
realistic modeling of observed behavior. See, for example, dAspremont and Dos
Santos Ferreira (2009) for discussion.
In what follows, we will provide a characterization of the whole cooperative-
noncooperative spectrum. At the one extreme, the fully cooperative solution corre-
sponds to the Pareto e¢ cient within-household allocation mentioned before. At the
other extreme, the fully noncooperative solution corresponds to a Nash equilibrium
allocation within the household. Finally, we also characterize the semicooperative
case, which is situated on a continuum between the cooperative case and the non-
cooperative case. We will argue that our characterization of this semicooperative
case has a natural interpretation in terms of the degree of cooperation within the
household.
The cooperative-noncooperative spectrum: literature review. By now,
the modeling of the fully cooperative case is quite complete. Browning and Chiap-
pori (1998) provide a local di¤erential characterization of the cooperative model. A
general nding is that if the household acts cooperatively, then the unitary condition
of Slutsky symmetry no longer holds. By contrast, cooperative behavior imposes
that there exists a household pseudo-Slutsky matrix that can be decomposed as the
sum of a symmetric negative semi-denite matrix and a matrix of rank 1 (in the
case of two household members). As shown by Chiappori and Ekeland (2006), this
condition, together with homogeneity and adding up, is also locally su¢ cient for
the existence of individual utility functions and Pareto weights that reproduce the
observed behavior. Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007, 2009a,b) complement
these local di¤erential results by presenting a global revealed preference characteri-
zation of the same cooperative model. In the tradition of Afriat (1967) and Varian
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(1982),2 they derived necessary and su¢ cient conditions for household consumption
data to be consistent with the model. For the publicly consumed quantities, these
conditions require the existence of suitable Lindahl prices such that each individual
in the household satises the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (garp; see
Section 2) when using these individual Lindahl prices to evaluate the public goods.
At the other extreme of the spectrum, the fully noncooperative model assumes
that each individual within the household maximizes her/his own utility given the
consumption of the other household members. In this case, the household consump-
tion decision is determined by the Nash equilibrium solution with voluntary contri-
butions for the publicly consumed goods. See, among others, Lundberg and Pollak
(1993), Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2007) and Lechene and Preston (2005,
2008). As for the (local) di¤erential characterization of this model, data consistency
with the noncooperative model requires the existence of a pseudo-Slutsky matrix that
can be decomposed as a symmetric negative semidenite matrix and a matrix with
rank less than the number of public goods plus 1 (again in the case of two household
members). Three remarks are important in view of our following exposition. First,
at present it is not known whether these noncooperative conditions are also (locally)
su¢ cient. Second, these noncooperative conditions are nested with the (di¤erential)
cooperative conditions mentioned above: data consistency with the cooperative con-
ditions always implies data consistency with the noncooperative conditions, but not
vice versa. Finally, to the best of our knowledge a complementary global revealed
preference characterization of the noncooperative household consumption model is
nonexistent in the literature.3
Between the two (cooperative and noncooperative) extremes, we can conceive a
continuum of semicooperative cases. These cases di¤er in the degree to which a cer-
tain household member behaves cooperatively towards the other household members.
We are aware of only one study that investigates these intermediate cases. Speci-
cally, dAspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira (2009) consider a semicooperative model
where the willingness to pay for public goods is between the Lindahl price vector
associated with the cooperative equilibrium and the market price vector. Focusing
on the local di¤erential characterization of this semicooperative behavior, they also
derive corresponding rank conditions on the pseudo-Slutsky matrix. We will discuss
the characterization of dAspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira in more depth when
we relate it to our characterization of semicooperative behavior. At this point, it
is important to indicate that the above three remarks for the noncooperative model
extend to the semicooperative model of dAspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira.
2See also Samuelson (1938), Houthakker (1950) and Diewert (1973) for seminal contributions on
the revealed preference approach to analyzing consumption behavior.
3However, see Sprumont (2000) for a revealed preference characterization of the noncooperative
Nash solution in a choice-theoretic framework à la Richter (1966).
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This study. We will develop an alternative framework for modeling household
consumption behavior characterized by varying degrees of cooperation; this frame-
work will contain the fully cooperative model and the fully noncooperative model
as limiting cases. We will explicitly discuss the relationship between our framework
and the one of dAspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira (2009). In contrast to most
research in the literature, we focus on the revealed preference characterization of
(cooperative, noncooperative and semicooperative) consumption behavior.
The revealed preference approach has a number of attractive features. First of
all, our characterization is global, which contrasts with the local characterization
obtained by the standard di¤erential approach. Specically, we get global conditions
that enable checking consistency of a given data set with a particular consumption
model; in the spirit of Varian (1982), we refer to this as testingdata consistency
with the model under study. Second, we are able to verify these conditions while
keeping their inherent nonparametric nature, i.e. the associated tests do not require
an a priori (typically non-veriable) parametric specication of the intrahousehold
decision process (e.g. individual preferences). By contrast, the di¤erential approach
(until present) usually maintains additional assumptions concerning the functional
form for the demand function (and thus individual preferences) when verifying the
abovementioned rank conditions of the pseudo-Slutsky matrix (e.g. Browning and
Chiappori (1998) start from a quadratic almost ideal demand system in their em-
pirical analysis). More specically, our nonparametric tests apply mixed integer
programming (MIP) methods, which combine linear constraints with binary integer
variables. This MIP formulation is particularly attractive from a practical point
of view: for a given data set, it allows for testing data consistency with a specic
consumption model by applying standard MIP solution techniques.
Two further features imply notable di¤erences with the di¤erential results de-
scribed above. First, the testable revealed preference conditions are not only neces-
sary but also su¢ cient for data consistency with specic (cooperative, noncooperative
and semicooperative) consumption models. Second, we will show that the conditions
for the semicooperative model (or, in a limiting case, the conditions of the fully non-
cooperative model) are not nested with the cooperative conditions: data consistency
with the (global) semicooperative conditions is neither necessary nor su¢ cient for
data consistency with the (global) cooperative conditions. This makes it interesting
to compare the empirical validity of di¤erent models. In fact, we can meaningfully
verify data consistency with a given model (and compare di¤erent models) even if
there are only a few observations and without restriction on the number of privately
consumed goods (see Section 4.4 and Section 5).
We demonstrate the practical usefulness of our approach through an empirical ap-
plication to data taken from the RLMS. As indicated above, as far as we know, this is
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the rst application of noncooperative and semicooperative household consumption
models to a real-life data set. Interestingly, this application demonstrates the empir-
ical relevance of our theoretical insights on independence (or non-nestedness) of, on
the one hand, the revealed preference conditions for the fully cooperative model and,
on the other hand, the revealed preference conditions for other (not fully coopera-
tive) models. As such, it motivates considering noncooperative and semicooperative
models in addition to the (more common) cooperative model in empirical analysis of
household consumption behavior.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. To set the stage, Section 2 re-
captures the revealed preference characterization of individually rational behavior.
Section 3 introduces a general household game concept, which applies to the con-
sumption decisions of multi-person households. This concept will provide the starting
point for our discussion in Section 4, which gives a revealed preference characteriza-
tion of the cooperative-noncooperative spectrum introduced above. This section also
discusses independence (or non-nestedness) between the conditions of non-unitary
consumption models characterized by di¤erent degrees of cooperation. Section 5 in-
troduces the MIP approach for empirical verication of the di¤erent conditions, and
presents our empirical application. Section 6 summarizes and formulates a number
of concluding remarks.
2 The rational individual benchmark
In this section, we provide a brief introduction to the theory of revealed preferences.
Specically, we consider the optimization problem of a rational single individual.
This will ease our following discussion of non-unitary consumption models, which
assume rational individuals.
Consider an individual with a utility function U . Throughout, we will assume that
utility functions U are continuous, concave, non-satiated and non-decreasing in their
arguments. Let T = f1; : : : ; jT jg be a set of observations. Given a (strictly positive)
price vector pt and income Yt (t 2 T ), we assume that the rational individual chooses
the consumption bundle q in her/his budget set that maximizes her/his utility. In
particular, the rational individual solves the following optimization problem (OP-I):4
qt 2 argmax
q
U (q) s:t: hpt;qi  Yt
A data set S = fpt; qtgt2T consists of a collection of strictly positive price vectors
pt and a collection of positive demand vectors qt. We use the following concept of
4Observe that, under our maintained assumptions for the utility function U , we have that in




Denition 1 (individual-rationalizability) Consider a data set S = fpt; qtgt2T .
The set S is individual-rationalizable if there exist a utility function U such that for
all t 2 T , the bundle qt solves OP-I given the price vector pt and income Yt = hpt;qti.
Varian (1982) established that the set S is individual-rationalizable if and only if
it satises the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (garp).
Denition 2 (garp) Consider a data set S = fpt; qtgt2T . The set S satises
garp if there exists a binary relation R such that the following holds. If hpt;qti 
hpt;qvi then qtRqv. Next, qtRqv if qtRqs; qsRql; :::; qzRqv for some sequence s; l; :::;
z. Finally, if qtRqv then hpv;qvi  hpv;qti.
In words, R captures the revealed preference relation in the data set S. We have
qtRqv if qt is directly revealed preferred to qv (i.e. hpt;qti  hpt;qvi) or indirectly
revealed preferred to qv (i.e. there exists a sequence s; l; :::; z such that qtRqs; qsRql;
:::; qzRqv). Finally, if qtRqv, then we must have hpv;qvi  hpv;qti, i.e. qv cannot be
more expensive than any revealed preferred qt.
The following theorem is probably the single most important result in revealed
preference theory (see Varian, 1982, based on Afriat, 1967).
Theorem 1 Consider a data set S = fpt; qtgt2T . The following conditions are equiv-
alent:
1. There exists a utility function U that individual-rationalizes S.
2. S satises garp.
3. For all t 2 T , there exist a positive number Ut and a strict positive number t
such that, for all t; v 2 T ,
Ut   Uv  v hpv;qt   qvi :
This result has two important implications. First, data consistency with garp
is necessary and su¢ cient for individual-rationalizability of the data; see condition
2. Next, condition 3 provides an equivalent characterization in terms of the so-
called Afriat inequalities, which allow an explicit construction of the utility levels
associated with each observation t (i.e. utility level Ut for observed qt). In our
following discussion of consumption models, we will mainly concentrate on the garp
characterization of rational individual behavior. As we will show, this focus on garp
enables us to formulate testable implications of consumption models in mixed integer
programming (MIP) terms (see Section 5). However, in principle our garp-based
characterization of consumption models can equivalently be expressed in terms of
Afriat inequalities (by building on Theorem 1; see also the proof of Theorem 4).
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3 The household game
To keep our exposition simple, we focus on 2-person (A and B) households in
what follows. However, extensions to households with more than 2 members are
fairly straightforward. Individuals have to decide over the consumption of a bun-
dle of jJ j private goods (J = f1; : : : ; jJ jg) and a bundle of jKj public goods (K =
f1; : : : ; jKjg). Given private and public consumption in the household, the util-
ity of the individuals A and B is given by the functions UA(qA; QA + QB) and
UB(qB; QA+QB), with qA and qB the private consumption bundles of A and B, and
QA and QB the contributions to the public goods from A and B.5 The fact that we
explicitly distinguish between A and Bs contributions to the public consumption
may seem a bit unconventional. However, this distinction will be essential for mod-
eling behavior that deviates from fully cooperative (or Pareto e¢ cient) household
behavior (e.g. Lechene and Preston, 2005, 2008, and dAspremont and Dos Santos
Ferreira (2009) make similar distinctions).
The household consumption levels depend on the intrahousehold decision making
process. As discussed in the Introduction, we will consider three types of non-unitary
household models, which will have di¤erent equilibrium characterizations: the coop-
erative case, which assumes a Pareto e¢ cient intrahousehold solution; the nonco-
operative case, which assumes a noncooperative Nash equilibrium solution; and the
semi-cooperative case, which is situated on a continuum between the cooperative and
the non-cooperative solutions. To formalize this idea, we will discuss the three mod-
els as particular cases of what we call the household game. Essentially, this household
game describes each consumption decision as resulting from a two-step process. In
a certain sense, this two-step representation generalizes the two-step representation
of the cooperative consumption model; see, for example, Chiappori (1988, 1992).
Just like for the cooperative model, it is important to remark that our two-step
representation of the household game should not necessarily correspond to the ac-
tual decision making process within the household. We only assume that observed
household behavior can be represented as if it follows from a two-step procedure.
In the rst step of the household game, the total household income Y is divided
between A and B, which denes the individual incomes Y A and Y B (with Y A +
Y B = Y ). In this study, we abstract from explicitly modeling this rst step. In
general, however, this intrahousehold income distribution can be seen as a function
of exogenous variables such as prices, household expenditures and other variables
that a¤ect household decisions but not the preferences or the household budget (i.e.
5Throughout, we will abstract from externalities associated with privately consumed quantities.
Importantly, however, our setting can actually account for such externalities. Specically, if an in-
dividual is the exclusive consumer of a particular private good, then we can account for externalities
for this good by formally treating it as a public good.
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so-called extra-environmental parameters in the terminology of McElroy (1990) or
distribution factors in the terminology of Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, and
Lechene (1994)). In the second step, each individual (A and B) decides on the
optimal level of the own private consumption and the own contribution to the level
of public goods, by maximizing her/his own utility subject to a personalized budget
constraint dened by the individual income. In doing so, the individual faces the price
vectors p and P for her/his choice of private consumption and public contribution.
In addition, in the general version of the household game, each individual receives
a donation from the other individual per unit of public good that she/he purchases.
We denote these donations for each good k 2 K by Ak and Bk ; A and B represent
the vectors of donations. We see at least two interpretations for these intrahousehold
donations related to public goods. First, one can see these donations as voluntary
contributions: as B benets from the purchase of QAk , it may be the case that
she/he is willing to contribute to the purchase of this bundle. Next, one can also
interpret them as representing an implicit tax that B has to pay for the benet of
receiving QAk . Both interpretations express that intrahousehold donations (i.e. a
given specication of Ak and 
B
k ) refer to the degree of (voluntary or obligatory)
cooperation within the household. This donation concept will play a crucial role in
our further exposition. Specically, it will allow us to characterize a whole spectrum
of cooperative-noncooperative household consumption models.
The empirical analysis of the household game starts from a data set S = fpt;
Pt; qt; Qtgt2T . For every observation t 2 T , the vectors Qt and qt (= qAt + qBt )
represent the household bundles of public and private goods demanded at t; and we
write qt;j, and Qt;k for the demanded quantity of private good j or public good k at
t (j 2 J , k 2 K). Thus, using pt for the (strictly positive) price vector of the private
commodities, Pt for the (strictly positive) price vector of the public commodities and
Yt for household income, the household faces the following budget constraint:
hpt;qi+ hPt; Qi  Yt;





t = Yt). Throughout, we will assume that the empirical analyst only
observes Yt and not Y At and Y
B











for her/his purchase of private and public goods corresponding to any choice
of qA and QA. In addition, she/he receives the amount Bt Q
A from B while she/he
pays At Q
B to B for any QB representing Bs contribution to the public goods. Thus,
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In what follows, we dene an equilibrium of the household game as an allocation
fqAt ; qBt ; QAt ; QBt g that simultaneously solves OP-H.A and OP-H.B for a particu-






t . In the next section, we will see that the three
equilibrium concepts in this paper depend entirely on the choice of At and 
B
t .
Before considering these equilibrium concepts in more detail, we characterize
the equilibrium for the general version of the household game. To this end, we
consider the marginal utility levels UAQt and U
B
Qt
of A and B at the equilibrium









with At and 
B
t the Lagrange multipliers (associated with the budget constraint) at
the equilibrium for A and B evaluated in observation t. The vectors ~PAt and ~P
B
t
represent the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for the bundle of public goods
associated withA andB. In particular, ~PAt;k represents the amount of income thatA is
willing to give up (at equilibrium) in order to receive one additional unit of the public
good k. For each public good k (which is consumed by a strictly positive amount),
the rst order equilibrium conditions for OP-H.A and OP-H.B (for Qt;k > 0) imply
maxf ~PAt;k + Bt;k; ~PBt;k + At;kg = Pt;k: (1)
This equality requirement is easily interpreted as an equilibrium condition. To see
this, let us consider the two possible inequality situations. First, if ~PAt;k + 
B
t;k > Pt;k
then the MWTP of A for one additional unit of k (i.e. ~PAt;k) is larger than the price
A has to pay for it (i.e. Pt;k   Bt ). Hence, A will increase her/his contribution to
good k. A directly similar interpretation applies to the situation ~PBt;k + 
A
t;k > Pt;k.
And, thus, maxf ~PAt;k + Bt;k; ~PBt;k + At;kg > Pt;k implies a disequilibrium. Next, if
maxf ~PAt;k+ Bt;k; ~PBt;k+ At;kg < Pt;k then either A or B (whoever contributes positively
to good k) will want to decrease her/his contribution to k. Again, this implies a
disequilibrium situation.
As a concluding remark, we point out two assumptions that we will maintain
in the next two sections. First, we will assume that the empirical analyst only
observes the aggregate private demands qt, and not the individual bundles qAt and





i.e. the private consumption of the individuals A and B is partly observed. See our
empirical application in Section 5 for a specic example. Next, we will assume that
all components of the aggregate demands Qt are strict positive. Again, we could
6If UA and UB are not di¤erentiable, we can take the subdi¤erentials that characterize the
optimal allocation.
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easily relax this assumption by introducing some additional notation, but this would
only complicate the discussion while not really adding any new insights. In fact, our
empirical application in Section 5 will consider data sets with some components of
Qt equal to zero; our basic theoretical insights developed below apply with equal
strength to this setting.
4 The cooperative-noncooperative spectrum
The household game discussed in the previous section allows us to provide a revealed
preference characterization of a whole spectrum of cooperative-noncooperative mod-
els of household consumption. As indicated above, di¤erent degrees of intrahousehold
cooperation then correspond to di¤erent specications of the intrahousehold dona-
tions (i.e. Ak and 
B
k ). To formalize this idea, we rst discuss the two extreme
cases mentioned in the Introduction, i.e. the fully cooperative model and the fully
noncooperative model. Subsequently, we present the semicooperative model, which
is situated on a continuum between these two limiting models.
4.1 The cooperative solution
The cooperative model assumes that the household consumption decision coincides
with a Pareto optimal allocation. An allocation fqAt ; qBt ; QAt ; QBt g is Pareto optimal
if for all allocations fq0A; q0B; Q0A+ Q0Bg that satisfy the same household budget




t ) implies U





t ). For our setting with concave utility functions, a Pareto optimal
allocation fqAt ; qBt ; QAt ; QBt g is usually characterized as maximizing a weighted sum
of individual utilities UA and UB subject to the given budget constraint; in this
characterization, the weights of UA and UB are commonly referred to as Pareto
weights. The revealed preference characterization of this cooperative model has been
discussed by Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007, 2009b). In what follows, we
briey recapture this characterization by integrating it with the household game
framework set out in the previous section. This will set the stage for our next
discussion of the noncooperative and semicooperative models.
As discussed in the previous section, the household game denes an equilibrium
bundle fqAt ; qBt ; QAt ; QBt g for a given income distribution Y At ; Y Bt and vectors At ,
Bt . Now assume that (in equilibrium) A considers to buy an additional unit of good
k. In order to pay for this extra consumption, A receives from B a contribution of
Bt;k. In a cooperative equilibrium, a natural assumption is that B pays according
to her/his valuation of this extra consumption. In other words, B agrees to pay
exactly her/his MWTP for this additional consumption; and this value is given by
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so that the equilibrium condition (1) becomes
maxf ~PAt;k + ~PBt;k; ~PBt;k + ~PAt;kg = Pt;k; or
~PAt;k +
~PBt;k = Pt;k: (2)
In words, for every public good k and at each observation t, the sum of the MWTP
of individuals A and B ( ~PAt;k and ~P
B
t;k) must equal the price Pt;k. As such, ~P
A
t;k and
~PBt;k can be interpreted as Lindahl prices and, thus, in this case the household game
equilibrium corresponds to an equilibrium with Lindahl prices. This conforms to the
well-known one-to-one correspondence between Lindahl price equilibria (with varying
incomes Y At and Y
B
t ) and the set of Pareto optimal allocations (with varying Pareto
weights for the individuals).
Given all this, we can next introduce the revealed preference characterization
of this cooperative consumption model. We rst dene the concept of cooperative-
rationalizability.
Denition 3 (cooperative-rationalizability) Consider a data set S = fpt; Pt;
qt; Qtgt2T . The set S is cooperative-rationalizable if there exist utility functions




+ that sum to qt and




+ that sum to Qt such that fqAt ; qBt ; QAt ; QBt g






The next result gives the revealed preference conditions corresponding with such
cooperative-rationalizability.
Theorem 2 Consider a data set S = fpt; Pt; qt; Qtgt2T . The following conditions
are equivalent:
1. There exists a pair of utility functions UA, UB that cooperative-rationalizes S.
2. For all t 2 T , there exist price vectors ~PAt ; ~PBt 2 R
jKj








t = qt; (C.1)
~PAt + ~P
B
t = Pt; and (C.2)
fpt; ~PAt ; qAt ; Qtgt2T and fpt; ~PBt ; qBt ; QTgt2T satisfy garp. (C.3)
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Condition C.3 implies that cooperative-rationalizability implies a garp condition
(i.e. individual-rationalizability) at the level of individuals A and B. The specicity
of the cooperative model is that these garp conditions use Lindahl prices ( ~PAt and
~PBt ) for evaluating the publicly consumed quantities; see condition C.2. It will be
interesting to compare this condition with the conditions that apply to the fully
noncooperative model and the semicooperative model.
Before doing so, we briey recapture the so-called sharing rule concept that is
intrinsic to the cooperative model of consumption behavior. Essentially, the sharing
rule denes the individual income shares Y At and Y
B
t corresponding to cooperative-
rationalizable household consumption behavior; see, for example, Chiappori (1988,
1992) for extensive discussion. In this respect, we recall that a data set S only
contains information on Yt and not on Y At and Y
B
t . However, in principle it is possible
to empirically identify Y At and Y
B
t (i.e. the sharing rule) if the set S is cooperative-






















= Y Bt : (3)






t (given the empirical
conditions C.1-C.3), then we can identify the income shares Y At and Y
B
t that underlie
the observed cooperative consumption behavior. We refer to Cherchye, De Rock and
Vermeulen (2009b) for a detailed discussion of this identiability result that starts
from the revealed preference characterization in Theorem 2.7 In what follows, we will
see that this identiability result does not hold in general for consumption models
that are not fully cooperative.
4.2 The noncooperative solution
Fully noncooperative household behavior means that individual A is not willing to
contribute to the purchase of QB and vice versa, which implies At = 
B
t = 0. In
this instance, the programs OP-H.A and OP-H.B correspond to the usual denition
of a Nash equilibrium; see, for example, Lechene and Preston (2005, 2008). Given
At = 
B
t = 0, the equilibrium condition (1) for the household game reduces to
maxf ~PAt;k; ~PBt;kg = Pt;k: (4)
The interpretation of this condition is directly analogous to the one of (1) discussed
above.
Let us then consider the revealed preference conditions of this noncooperative
model for a data set S = fpt; Pt; qt; Qtgt2T . Similar to before, we dene the concept
7Chiappori and Ekeland (2009) provide related identiability results that start from a di¤erential
characterization of the cooperative model.
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of noncooperative-rationalizability.
Denition 4 (noncooperative-rationalizability) Consider a data set S = fpt;
Pt; qt; Qtgt2T . The set S is noncooperative-rationalizable if there exist utility func-









+ that sum to Qt such that




We obtain the following result.
Theorem 3 Consider a data set S = fpt; Pt; qt; Qtgt2T . The following conditions
are equivalent:
1. There exists a pair of utility functions UA, UB that noncooperative-rationalizes
S.
2. For all t 2 T and k 2 K; there exist price vectors ~PAt ; ~PBt 2 R
jKj
+ and quantity













= Pt;k, and (NC.2)
fpt; ~PAt ; qAt ; Qtgt2Tand fpt; ~PBt ; qBt ; Qtgt2T satisfy garp. (NC.3)
Moreover, it follows that
~PAt;k < Pt;k if and only if Q
A
t;k = 0 and Q
B
t;k = Qt;k, and (NC.4)
~PBt;k < Pt;k if and only if Q
B
t;k = 0 and Q
A
t;k = Qt;k. (NC.5)
The interpretation of NC.1-NC.3 is similar to the one of C.1-C.3 in Theorem 2.
The main di¤erence is restriction NC.2 in Theorem 3, which replaces restriction C.2
in Theorem 2. The restrictions NC.4 and NC.5 follow from the fact that, if ~PAt;k < Pt;k
( ~PBt;k < Pt;k), then A (B) will sell back any positive amount of the public good k. This
implies QAt;k = 0 (Q
B
t;k = 0) and, thus, Q
B
t;k = Qt;k (Q
A
t;k = Qt;k). Note that we can
have ~PAt;k + ~P
B
t;k > Pt;k, which contrasts with (2) that applies to the cooperative case.
In fact, this di¤erence between ~PAt;k + ~P
B
t;k and Pt;k indicates an e¢ ciency loss in the
consumption of public goods caused by Pareto ine¢ cient (or not fully cooperative)
behavior.
Two further remarks are in order. First, if we had imposed the additional as-
sumption that for all t 2 T and k 2 K the contributions QAt;k and QBt;k are everywhere
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strictly positive, then we would have derived a simpler characterization of noncoop-
erative behavior. Specically, it can be veried that condition NC.3 in Theorem 3
would have reduced to requiring bundles qAt and q
B
t that sum to qt such that the
sets fpt; Pt; qAt ; Qtgt2T and fpt; Pt; qBt ; Qtgt2T both satisfy garp. However, the as-
sumption that all QAt;k and Q
B
t;k are positive is problematic. Specically, Browning,
Chiappori and Lechene (2007) have shown that generically (i.e. in all but a partic-
ular set of cases) the number of public goods to which both individuals contribute
is less than or equal to one. This suggests only assuming that QAt;k and Q
B
t;k are
non-negative, which e¤ectively obtains the characterization in Theorem 3.8
The nal remark pertains to our earlier discussion of (3) for the cooperative
model. We have indicated that, in principle, under cooperative-rationalizability the
(unobserved) within-household income distribution (i.e. the sharing rule) can be
identied from the observed set S. This identiability result does not generally hold
under noncooperative-rationalizability. Specically, it directly follows from the bud-
get constraints in OP-H.A and OP-H.B that, under noncooperative-rationalizability,




























= Y Bt : (5)
Given this, conditions NC.4 and NC.5 imply that Y At and Y
B
t are uniquely identied
only if for all k and t we have ~PAt;k < Pt;k (so that Q
A
t;k = 0 and Q
B
t;k = Qt;k) or
~PBt;k < Pt;k (so that Q
B
t;k = 0 and Q
A
t;k = Qt;k). This last situation conforms to
the so-called separate spheres Nash equilibrium concept; see Lundberg and Pollak
(1993) and Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2007). On the other hand, as soon
as there is one public good k to which both individuals contribute for some t (i.e.
~PAt;k =
~PBt;k = Pk), it is impossible to exactly recover the income shares Y
A
t and
Y Bt that underlie the observed noncooperative behavior. Specically, in this case
QAt;k and Q
B







thus, the expenditures on good k can not be assigned to the individual household
members. Interestingly, this result complies with the so-called local income pooling
result, which also applies to situations where both individuals contribute to the
same public good in a noncooperative setting; see Kemp (1984), Bergstrom, Blume
and Varian (1986) and Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2007). However, even
though we cannot identify Y At and Y
B
t in such a situation, it is still possible to
recover upper and lower bounds on values for Y At and Y
B
t that are consistent with a
noncooperative-rationalization of the given data set. These bounds then account for
the total (non-assignable) expenditures on the jointly contributed public goods.
8However, see Lechene and Preston (2005) for some example settings where the assumption of
strictly positive QAt;k and Q
B
t;k is always satised.
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4.3 The semicooperative solution
In contrast to the cooperative and noncooperative cases discussed before, there is
no obvious way to model semicooperative household consumption behavior. In this
section, we forward a model that extends the interpretation of the previous (limiting)
models to situations characterized by intermediate levels of intrahousehold coopera-
tion. We believe this model captures most characteristics of both models in a realistic
and intuitive way. To enhance the intuition of the model, we will compare it with -to
the best of our knowledge- the only alternative semicooperative model that has been
suggested in the literature, i.e. the model of dAspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira
(2009).
Following our reasoning in the previous sections, we characterize the semicoop-
erative model in terms of the parameters At and 
B
t . We recall that the cooperative





~PBt , while the noncooperative case corre-
sponds to At = 
B
t = 0. This naturally suggests to characterize the semicooperative
case by At , 
B
t such that










0  At;k  1 and 0  Bt;k  1.
Let us interpret this semicooperative model in terms of the household game de-
scribed above. Assume that (in equilibrium) individual A wants to increase her/his
contribution to public good k by one unit, and individual Bs MWTP for this increase
is ~PBt;k. However, individual B is not fully cooperative and, thus, she/he is unwilling
to pay this entire amount to A when purchasing the additional public good. On the
other hand, she/he is not fully noncooperative either. Therefore, individual B will
contribute Bt;k situated between zero and ~P
B
t;k and, thus, there exists a constant 
B
t;k
such that B is willing to contributes Bt;k ~P
B
t;k to the purchase of the good. This cor-
responds to the interpretation of the intrahousehold donations (Ak and 
B
k ) in terms
of voluntary intrahousehold cooperation; in this case, Bt;k represents a subsidy from
B to A. When interpreting the same donations in terms of obligatory cooperation,
we can think of Bt;k as a tax rate which individual B faces on his MWTP for the fact
that A purchases the public good. Finally, we obviously have that At;k = 
B
t;k = 1 for
all t and k corresponds to fully cooperative behavior, and At;k = 
B
t;k = 0 for all t and
k complies with fully noncooperative behavior.
For given At;k and 
B
t;k, the equilibrium condition (1) for the household game is
given as
maxf ~PAt;k + Bt;k ~PBt;k; ~PBt;k + At;k ~PAt;kg = Pt;k: (6)
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The intuition of this condition is directly similar to the one of (1), which was ex-
plained before. We remark that we can have ~PBt;k + ~P
A
t;k > Pt;k for some k if 
A
t;k 6= 0
or Bt;k 6= 0. Like for the fully noncooperative case, such an inequality indicates an
e¢ ciency loss due to limited cooperation.
Let us then formulate the corresponding revealed preference conditions. We rst
dene the concept of semicooperative-rationalizability.
Denition 5 (semicooperative-rationalizability) Consider a data set S = fpt;
Pt; qt; Qtgt2T . The set S is semicooperative-rationalizable if there exist At;k and












to Qt such that fqAt ; qB; QAt ; QBt g simultaneously solve OP-H.A and OP-H.B under









The following theorem characterizes the collection of data sets that are semicooperative-
rationalizable.
Theorem 4 Consider a data set S = fpt; Pt; qt; Qtgt2T . The following conditions
are equivalent:
1. There exists a pair of utility functions UA, UB that semicooperative-rationalizes
S.


























= Pt;k , and (SC.2)
fpt; ~PAt ; qAt ; Qtgt2T and fpt; ~PBt ; qBt ; Qtgt2T satisfy garp. (SC.3)




~PBk;t < Pk;t if and only if Q
A
k;t = 0 and Q
B
k;t = Qk;t, and (SC.4)
At;k
~PAk;t +
~PBk;t < Pk;t if and only if Q
B
k;t = 0 and Q
A
k;t = Qk;t. (SC.5)
The interpretation is readily similar to the one of Theorem 3. Like in the nonco-
operative case, we have that the individual income shares (Y At and Y
B
t ) underlying
observed semicooperative behavior are not identiable in general. Mutatis mutandis,
our discussion of (5) caries over to this semicooperative case.





A and Bt;k = 
B
for all t and k. This will substantially simplify our exposition. The fact that the
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parameters A and B are independent of t means that the subsidy (i.e. voluntary
donations) or tax rate (i.e. obligatory donations) does not change over observations.
It is possible to relax this assumption, but this comes at the cost of a considerable
increase of the computational complexity of the testable MIP conditions. Next,
constant A and B also imposes that the donations At and 
B
t are proportional to
the MWTP vectors ~PAt and ~P
B
t . In other words, if individual Bs MWTP for some
good k1 is twice her/his MWTP for some other good k2, then her/his contribution
per unit of k1 will also be twice as large as her/his contribution per unit of k2.
Although it is also possible to relax this assumption (again at the cost of additional
computational burden), we will stick to it as we believe it is quite intuitive and
plausible in the current context.
As a nal note, it is useful to compare our model with the one of dAspremont
and Dos Santos Ferreira (2009). Consider a data set S and let fq0At ; q0Bt ; Q0At ; Q0Bt g be
a cooperative (Pareto e¢ cient) equilibrium for the household game, with At and 
B
t
the associated Lindahl prices (i.e. At and 
B
t give the MWTP vectors for A and B
at this cooperative equilibrium; see our above discussion of the cooperative model).
Then, the model of dAspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira is characterized by the
following rst order condition:9
maxf ~PAt;k + BBt;k; ~PBt;k + AAt;kg = Pt;k: (7)
This equilibrium condition is closely similar to the condition (6) that applies to
our model. However, there is one crucial di¤erence. Specically, in the model of
dAspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira the intrahousehold donations per unit of any
public good k (captured by A and B in (7)) is proportional to the MWTP for this
public good in the Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium (At;k and 
B
t;k in (7)). By contrast, in
our model these donations are proportional to the MWTP for the same goods in the
semicooperative equilibrium ( ~PAt;k and ~P
B
t;k in (6)). Thus, depending on the value of
A and B, the two models may lead to di¤erent outcomes. In addition, our above
discussion makes clear that the two semicooperative models have a rather di¤erent
interpretation, even though they have a similar structure.
A main motivation to focus on our version of the semicooperative model, and
not on the one of dAspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira, is that our model only uses
information on the MWTP for quantities that are e¤ectively observed (i.e. in the
data set S), while the alternative model of dAspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira
requires information on the MWTP for quantities in some unobserved cooperative
equilibrium (associated with the same data set S). The fact that we only use observ-
9dAspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira (2009) originally expressed their equilibrium condition
in a di¤erent form. However, the formulation in (7) is easily obtained by slightly rearranging this
original formulation.
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able quantity information is interesting from a practical point of view. Specically,
as we will explain in Section 5, it allows us to reformulate the revealed preference
condition in Theorem 4 in MIP terms. As far as we can see, it is not possible to
obtain a similar MIP formulation for the revealed preference characterization of the
model of dAspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira, precisely because this model requires
unobservable quantity information.
4.4 Independence
We can show that the revealed preference conditions for noncooperative behavior are
independent of the revealed preference conditions for cooperative behavior: a data
set that satises the cooperative conditions does not necessarily satisfy the noncoop-
erative conditions, and vice versa. Specically, the two examples in Appendix 2 show
that there is neither any inclusion nor any exclusion relation between the collection
of data sets that satisfy the conditions in Theorem 2 and the collection of data sets
that satisfy the conditions in Theorem 3. For simplicity, these examples focus on
the (limiting) fully cooperative and fully noncooperative cases. However, in principle
we can construct similar (but substantially more complex) examples that pertain to
the (intermediate) semicooperative model characterized in Theorem 4. Thus, we can
conclude that models characterized by di¤erent degrees of cooperation are generally
independent of each other.
This independence/non-nestedness conclusion is important for at least two rea-
sons. Firstly, this result stands in sharp contrast with the ndings in the (local)
di¤erential approach to modeling non-unitary consumption behavior. As discussed
in the Introduction, the rationalizability conditions for the noncooperative and semi-
cooperative models derived in that approach are generally nested with the rational-
izability conditions for the cooperative model: if a given data set passes the (local)
condition for cooperative rationalizability, then it should also pass the test for nonco-
operative rationalizability, but not vice versa. Secondly, our empirical application in
Section 5 will show that this independence is not a theoretical curiosity but also has
empirical relevance. Specically, this application does e¤ectively include data that
are cooperative-rationalizable but not noncooperative-rationalizable, and (di¤erent)
data that are noncooperative-rationalizable but not cooperative-rationalizable.
Apart from independence, the examples in Appendix 2 demonstrate two further
features of our revealed preference conditions that are important in view of empir-
ical applications. First, they show that we can meaningfully test data consistency
with specic household consumption models (and compare the empirical validity of
di¤erent models) even if only a few observations are available. Second, because all
consumption is public in both examples, such empirical analysis in principle does
not require privately consumed goods. In fact, this last feature implies an additional
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di¤erence with the existing di¤erential characterizations of noncooperative and semi-
cooperative models: these di¤erential characterizations typically require (much) more
privately consumed goods than publicly consumed goods in order to obtain empir-
ically testable restrictions; see Lechene and Preston (2005, 2008) and dAspremont
and Dos Santos Ferreira (2009).
5 Empirical application
We apply our method to data drawn from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
(RLMS). Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2009b,c) studied the same data set.
These authors focused on consistency of these data with the cooperative model of
household consumption. We extend these earlier studies by providing complementary
results pertaining to noncooperative and semicooperative consumption models. In
doing so, we also generalize the MIP methodology introduced by these authors (for
the cooperative case) to apply to models of noncooperative and semicooperative
household behavior.
Our following analysis will concentrate on consistency testing, and will par-
ticularly illustrate the empirical relevance of the independence result articulated
above (see Section 4.4). If household behavior is found consistent with a particular
(cooperative-noncooperative) model, then subsequent analysis can focus on recov-
ering/identifying the specicities of the decision model that underlies the (rational-
izable) observed consumption behavior. For brevity, we do not consider recovery
issues in this application. However, we will return to recovery (based on our MIP
methodology) in the concluding section.
5.1 Verication
To be able to verify the garp conditions in Theorems 2-4, we reformulate these
conditions in mixed integer programming (MIP) terms. We focus on formulating the
MIP program for the semicooperative model, with endogenous variables A; B 2
[0; 1]. It follows from our above discussion that the program for the fully cooperative
and fully noncooperative models correspond to A = B = 1 and A = B = 0,
respectively.
To obtain the MIP formulation, we dene the binary variables xMt;v 2 f0; 1g,

















M = A;B, has a straightforwardly similar meaning as qtRqv in Section 2). Then,
a data set S satises the necessary and su¢ cient condition for semicooperative-
rationalizability in Theorem 4 if and only if the following MIP problem is feasible:
For all t; v 2 T and all k 2 K, there exist strictly positive vectors ~PAt ; ~PBt , binary
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variables zt;k; xMt;v 2 f0; 1g, and parameters A, B 2 [0; 1] such that (for s; t; v 2 T ,
k 2 K, M = A;B):10
~PAt + 
B ~PBt  Pt; (8)
A ~PAt +
~PBt  Pt; (9)
Pt;k   ~PAt;k   B ~PBt;k  zt;kCt; (10)
Pt;k   A ~PAt;k   ~PBt;k  (1  zt;k)Ct; (11)
qAt + q
B























~PMv ; Qv  Qt
E
; (15)
with Ct > Pt;k and Ct > Yt for all t and k:
The interpretation is as follows. Constraint (12) imposes that the private con-
sumption bundles qAt and q
B
t sum to the observed aggregate quantities qt, as re-
quired by condition SC.1. Further, constraints (8)-(11) comply with condition SC.2
in Theorem 4. Specically, (8) and (9) impose the given upper bound constric-
tion for ~PAt and ~P
B
t . Next, (10) imposes Pt;k  ~PAt;k + B ~PBt;k if zt;k = 0, while
(11) imposes Pt;k  A ~PAt;k + ~PBt;k if zt;k = 1. Because zt;k 2 f0; 1g, this implies
maxf ~PAt;k + B ~PBt;k; ~PBt;k + A ~PAt;kg = Pt;k and thus condition SC.2 is satised. Fi-
nally, constraints (13)-(15) correspond to the garp conditions for each individ-
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E









Next, constraint (14) imposes transitivity of the individual revealed preference re-
































~PMv ; Qv  Qt
E









Clearly, all constraints are linear for the cooperative case (with A = B = 1)
and the noncooperative case (with A = B = 0). Linearity implies that the above
program can be solved by standard MIP methods for a given data set S. As for the
semi-cooperative case, the constraints are obviously linear if we know the values of A
and B. If we do not know these values (which is usually the case), then we suggest










~PMt ; Qt  Qv
E
< xMt;vCt is di¢ cult to use in IP analysis.









~PMt ; Qt  Qv
E
+   xMt;vCt for 
(> 0) arbitrarily small.
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a whole range of possible values for A and B. In fact, this can provide a denite
answer on whether the data satisfy the rationalizability condition in Theorem 4 with
arbitrarily large probability. To see this, we rst note that the parameter space
A  B is [0; 1]  [0; 1], which is of size 1. Let us assume that the subspace with
A and B obtaining a semicooperative-rationalizability of the given data set has at
least size ". Then, we get that any random draw out of [0; 1]  [0; 1] has at least
probability " to lead to a rationalization. In other words, with probability less then
(1  ") no rationalization is found. So, if we take n random draws from [0; 1] [0; 1],
then with probability at least 1  (1  ")n, we must nd a rationalization. By taking
n large enough, we can make this probability as close to 1 as desirable for any given
". In our following application, we will use an equally sparsed grid search with step
0:1 for A; B 2 [0; 1], which implies n = 121:
5.2 Data
We refer to Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2009b,c) for a detailed discussion of
the RLMS data that we use. These authors also provide more specic information
on the assignability procedure that we present below. For compactness, we restrict
ourselves to a brief summary here.
Our sample consists of 148 adult couples, with both (female and male) household
members employed. We consider each of the 148 households separately, which avoids
(often debatable) preference homogeneity assumptions across male or female mem-
bers of di¤erent households. This illustrates the use of our method for a panel data
set. However, it is worth emphasizing that revealed preference methods such as ours
are equally applicable to (repeated) cross-section data sets. In this respect, we refer
to Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003, 2008) for some recent methodological
advances.
Our data set covers the period from 1994 to 2003. We have consumption data
for each year except for the years 1997 and 1999, so that we end up with 8 (= jT j)
observations (prices and quantities) per household. We consider bundles consisting
of 21 (= jJ j + jKj) nondurable goods: (1) food outside the home, (2) clothing, (3)
car fuel, (4) wood fuel, (5) gas fuel, (6) luxury goods, (7) services, (8) housing rent,
(9) bread, (10) potatoes, (11) vegetables, (12) fruit, (13) meat, (14) dairy products,
(15) fat, (16) sugar, (17) eggs, (18) sh, (19) other food items, (20) alcohol and (21)
tobacco. We assume that wood fuel, gas fuel and housing rent are public (jKj = 3),
while the other goods are private (jJ j = 18).
Our application will show the possibility of including specic information on qAt
and qBt , i.e. we can assign private consumption to individuals A and B. Formally,
this means that assignable quantities qaMt (M = A;B) act as lower bounds for the
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quantities qMt , i.e.
qMt  qaMt .
Essentially, the procedure starts from a base scenario for the distribution of the
privately consumed quantities across the two household members. Because assignable
quantity information is not directly available from the RLMS data set, this base
scenario uses the observed consumption of male and female singles (or one-person
households).11 In subsequent steps, we consider less and less assignability, i.e. we
account for (ever larger) deviations from the base scenario distribution. Formally,
using qbMt for the private quantities of memberM that correspond to the hypothesized




with 0    1. The parameter  captures the extent to which we allow for deviations
from the base scenario distribution. For example,  = 1 implies qaMt = q
bM
t , while
 < 1 implies qaMt < q
bM
t . Generally, lower  values imply less stringent restrictions
for the private quantities. Varying the value of  will allow us to compare di¤erent
cooperative-noncooperative models under varying degrees of assignability.
5.3 Results
To structure our discussion, we rst provide empirical results for the (limiting) co-
operative (with A = B = 1) and noncooperative (with A = B = 0) models
for the full sample of households. Subsequently, we report on the (intermediate)
semicooperative model (with A; B 2 [0; 1]) for specic households.
Table 1 presents pass rates for the cooperative model and the noncooperative
model under di¤erent degrees of assignability (captured by ). The table reveals that
pass rates increase if  decreases. This is not surprising given that lower  values
comply with less assignable information for the privately consumed quantities. For
one household, we need  = 0:60 for a rationalization in terms of the cooperative
model as well as the noncooperative model. If we look at the aggregate pass rates
in Table 1, we do not nd much di¤erence between the cooperative model and the
noncooperative model. To some extent, this provides empirical support for both
types of non-unitary models (conditional on the base scenario that is assumed).
Still, even though the two models provide a rather good overall t of observed
household behavior, there are some notable di¤erences for specic households. For
example, for  = 0:90 the noncooperative model rationalizes the behavior of two
more households than the cooperative model, while for  = 0:80 we observe a bet-
11For example, it is observed that the average budget share of alcohol for male singles is (about)
5 times the corresponding budget share for female singles. Given this, in the base scenario the male
consumes 5/6 of all alcohol bought by the household and the female consumes 1/6.
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ter t of the cooperative model. Table 2 provides more detailed results pertaining
to individual households. Specically, it reports on (i) the number of households
that are noncooperative-rationalizable but not cooperative-rationalizable and (ii) the
number of households that are cooperative-rationalizable but not noncooperative-
rationalizable. The table suggest that the adequate behavioral model varies with the
household under consideration: for some households the cooperative model provides
a better t of observed behavior than the noncooperative model, while the oppo-
site holds for other households. Generally, this motivates the empirical relevance of
considering noncooperative models of household behavior in addition to the (more
common) cooperative model.
As a further base of comparison, we have also calculated power results for the dif-
ferent model specications. Specically, for each household and each  we compute
a power measure that quanties the probability of detecting random behavior. Ran-
dom behavior is then modeled using a bootstrap method: for each observation, with
given prices and income, we dene quantities by randomly drawing budget shares
(for the 21 goods) from the set of 1184 (= 148 x 8) observed household choices.12
Thus, our power assessment gives information on the expected distribution of vi-
olations under random choice, while incorporating information on the households
actual choices.
Table 1 reports on the distribution of the power measure dened over the 148
households under study. These results are based on Monte Carlo-type simulations
that include 1000 iterations. We nd that the power varies a lot across households
and models: while it is reasonably high for some households (see in particular the
maximum and 3rd quartile values for higher ), it is also very low for other households
(see the minimum and 1st quartile values). Generally, these results suggest that
assignable quantity information can be particularly helpful to enhance the power of
tests for non-unitary models (with or without cooperation). Next, we recall that our
analysis uses only 8 observations per household. Obviously, power can only improve
when more observations become available.
In the context of the present study, it seems particularly interesting to compare
the power of the cooperative and noncooperative models.13 For the data under
consideration, we observe that the power distribution for the noncooperative model
is situated somewhat below the one for the cooperative model for each value of
. However, the di¤erence is very small; we can safely conclude that the power
distributions are generally close to each other. In our opinion, this provides additional
12See Bronars (1987) and Andreoni and Harbaugh (2006) for general discussions on alternative
procedures to evaluate power in the context of revealed preference tests such as ours.
13To compute the power results in Tables 1, we have used the same distribution of randomly
drawn budget shares to evaluate the cooperative and noncooperative models. Obviously, this is
needed to meaningfully compare the power of the two types of models. A similar qualication
applies to the power results in Table 3.
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motivation for considering non-unitary models with limited cooperation in addition
to the fully cooperative model.
[Table 1 about here]
[Table 2 about here]
As a nal exercise, we consider the semicooperative model. Specically, Table
3 reports on two households selected on the basis of the results in Table 2: for
 = 1:00, household 1 can be rationalized in terms of the noncooperative model but
not in terms of the cooperative model, and households 2 can be rationalized in terms
of the cooperative model but not in terms of the noncooperative model. Table 3
gives test results (1 = pass; 0 = fail) and power estimates for the semicooperative-
rationalizability conditions corresponding to 121 combinations of A; B 2 [0; 1], when
using  = 1:00.14
The results suggest that our methodology can be useful to dene bounds on the
values of A and B that are consistent with semicooperative-rationalizable behavior
for specic households. Given that A and B indicate the degree of cooperation of
each individual household member, these bounds tell us about the extent to which
observed household consumption behavior is characterized by (limited) intrahouse-
hold cooperation. Interestingly, the results in Table 3 show that di¤erent household
members may well be characterized by other degrees of cooperation in the semico-
operative equilibrium (i.e. A and B have di¤erent bounds). In our opinion, an
interesting following step can relate these ndings on (varying) intrahousehold coop-
eration to specic characteristics of the household and/or household members. Such
an exercise falls beyond the scope of the current study (also because of limited data
availability). In this respect, our discussion in the concluding section will point out
that combining experimental data with our methodology constitutes an interesting
avenue for addressing this type of questions.
[Table 3 about here]
6 Concluding discussion
We have presented a revealed preference toolkit for analyzing non-unitary house-
hold consumption behavior identied by varying degrees of cooperation. We started
14Results for other  values and other households are available upon request.
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from global characterizations of non-unitary rationalizable behavior, which comple-
ment the existing local di¤erential characterizations. Our toolkit allows for empirical
analysis of such behavior while avoiding (typically nonveriable) parametric structure
for the household decision process. Such analysis can make use of MIP techniques,
and is thus easy-to-implement. Our application to RLMS data suggests the empiri-
cal relevance of considering household consumption models that account for limited
cooperation in addition to the (more common) model that assumes fully cooperative
behavior.
To focus our discussion, we have concentrated on the characterization of con-
sumption models with di¤erent degrees of cooperation, and testing consistency of
observed behavior with alternative model specications. If observed behavior is
consistent with a particular model (i.e. can be rationalized), then a natural next
question pertains to recovering/identifying the decision model that underlies the (ra-
tionalizable) observed consumption behavior. Such recovery can start from the MIP
methodology presented in this paper. In this respect, see Cherchye, De Rock and
Vermeulen (2009b), who consider these questions for the cooperative model; their
analysis is directly extended to the noncooperative and semicooperative models dis-
cussed here. Their basic argument is that nonparametric revealed preference recovery
on the basis of an MIP characterization of rational behavior boils down to dening
feasible sets characterized by the MIP constraints.
We see at least two interesting applications of recovery. First, recovery can focus
on the individualsMWTP for the publicly consumed goods. As indicated above,
lack of intrahousehold cooperation implies that the sum of these individual MWTP
deviates from the observed prices for the publicly consumed goods. The MIP method
can be used for quantifying this discrepancy between MWTP and observed prices
(as a measure for the e¢ ciency loss caused by limited cooperation) in empirical ap-
plications. Next, one can try to recover the income distribution that is associated
with rationalizable behavior while accounting for limited cooperation. As a matter
of fact, the literature on cooperative household consumption behavior has paid con-
siderable attention to analyzing the intrahousehold distribution underlying observed
cooperative-rationalizable behavior. See, for example, Browning, Bourguignon, Chi-
appori and Lechene (1994), Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005), Browning, Chi-
appori and Lewbel (2006) and Lewbel and Pendakur (2008), who focus on various
welfare-related questions associated with sharing rule recovery. The methodology
presented in this paper allows for analyzing similar questions for noncooperative and
semicooperative models.15
15However, we recall our discussion (at the end of Section 4.2) on identiability problems for
noncooperative and semicooperative household consumption behavior when both individuals con-
tribute the same public goods. In this case, it is only possible to recover upper and lower bounds
on the individual income shares that account for the total (non-assignable) expenditures on these
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Finally, the current study has concentrated on analyzing household consumption
behavior. However, the same methodology can also be used to analyze multi-person
group behavior. Indeed, a lot of situations involve groups of individuals spending
a joint budget; e.g. decisions of committees, clubs, villages and other local orga-
nizations, or rms with multiple decision makers. Chiappori and Ekeland (2006,
2009) suggest the cooperative (Pareto e¢ cient) model as a natural benchmark for
assessing the collective rationality of such group decisions. Our methodology allows
for assessing group decisions that do not meet this benchmark. In this respect, an
interesting avenue for follow-up research consists of analyzing group consumption
behavior on the basis of data gathered by means of a laboratory experiment. In
fact, it has been argued that the nonparametric revealed preference methodology is
particularly useful in combination with such experimental data. See, for example,
Sippel (1997), Harbaugh, Krause and Berry (2001) and Andreoni and Miller (2002)
for earlier applications that experimentally analyze individually rational behavior.
For example, experiments can use our methodology to focus on specic conditions
(e.g. individual and group characteristics or other exogenous circumstances that
can be manipulated) that trigger(di¤erent degrees of) cooperative/noncooperative
behavior in multi-person consumption decisions.
Appendix 1: proof of Theorem 4
We will only prove Theorem 4. The proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 are directly similar
to this one and, therefore, we leave them to the reader.
1)2. Pick any t 2 T and consider the OP-H.A and OP-H.B. Let UM
qMt
and UMQt
(M = A;B) be the subgradients for the function UM at bundle (qMt ; Qt); and 
A
t
and Bt the Lagrange multipliers for the budget constraints in OP-H.A and OP-H.B.







t (Pt   Bt );
UBQt  
B
t (Pt   At ):
The inequalities are replaced by equalities in case the quantities of the goods under
consideration are strictly positive. Next, concavity of the utility functions UA and
jointly contributed public goods.
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UB implies for all t; v 2 T :
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A(qAt ; QT ) = U
A
t and
UB(qBt ; Qt) = U
B
t . This gives:









~PAv ; Qt  Qv
E
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~PBv ; Qt  Qv
E
:
Using Theorem 1, we know that these two conditions are equivalent to the conditions
that fpt; ~PAt ; qAt ; Qtgt2T and fpt; ~PBt ; qBt ; Qtgt2T satisfy garp. This obtains SC.3.







~PAt;k for all k 2 K and t 2 T . If ~PAt;k + B ~PBt;k < Pt;k, we know that QAt;k = 0 and,
thus, QBt;k = Qt;k > 0. Then, the rst order condition for k 2 K in OP-H.B must be
binding, so that At;k ~P
A
t;k +
~PBt;k = Pt;k. This obtains the rst part of SC.1. Reversing
the roles of A and B shows the other part of SC.1. Similarly, one can verify SC.4
and SC.5.
2)1. From the garp conditions and Theorem 1 we know that there exist positive
numbers UAt , U
B
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~PBv ; Qt  Qv
E
:
Dene the functions UA and UB such that:
































Notice that UA and UB are continuous, concave, strictly monotone and that for all
t 2 T , UA(qAt ; Qt) = UAt and UB(qBt ; Qt) = UBt . See, for example, Varian (1982).
We need to show that the functions UA and UB provide a semicooperative ratio-
nalization of the data set. For brevity, we only provide the argument for UA, but a
straightforwardly analogous reasoning applies to UB. For all t 2 T; deneQAt andQBt
so that if ~PAt;k+
B
t;k
~PBt;k < Pt then Q
A
t;k = 0 and Q
B





then QBt;k = 0 and Q
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(Pt;k   Bt;k ~PBt;k)QAt;k (16)
Then, we have to prove UA(qA; Q)  UA(qAt ; Qt). To obtain this result, we rst
































































































This provides the wanted result, i.e. fqAt ; QAt g solves OP-H.A.
Appendix 2: independence - examples
Throughout, we will use " to represent a strictly positive but su¢ ciently small num-
ber.
Example 1: cooperative-rationalizable but not noncooperative-
rationalizable
Werst construct a data set that is cooperative-rationalizable but not noncooperative-
rationalizable. The data set contains 3 observations (T = ft; v; wg) and 3 public






1CA ; Qv =
0B@"1
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1CA ; Pv =
0B@47
4










1CA ; ~PAv =
0B@4  "3:5
"









1CA ; ~PBv =
0B@ "3:5
4  "
1CA ; ~PBw =
0B@ 4  "4  "
7  "2
1CA :
This specication clearly meets the condition ~PAs + ~P
B
s = Pt (s 2 T ). By com-
puting for both members all inner vector-products, ~PMs Qu(s; u 2 T;M = A;B); it
is straightforward to verify that f ~PAt ; Qtgt2T and f ~PBt ; Qtgt2T both satisfy garp.
As such the data set meets the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for cooperative-
rationalizability in Theorem 2.
We still need to prove that the data set S is not noncooperative-rationalizable.





= Ps;k for all s 2 T and k 2 K. Thus,
we have to specify ~PAt;1 = 7 or ~P
B
t;1 = 7. Without loss of generality, we assume
~PAt;1 = 7. Then, given that " is small enough, it directly follows that QtR
AQv and
QtR
AQw. Similarly, for observation v, there must be an individual M (= A or B)
so that ~PMv;2 = 7. Because the set f ~PAt ; Qtgt2T has to satisfy garp (and QtRAQv),
we have to chooseM = B and thus QvRBQt and QvRBQw. Finally, we must specify
M (= A or B) so that ~PMw;3 = 7. Any choice of M makes that garp is violated
either by the set f ~PAt ; Qtgt2T (because QtRAQw) or by the set f ~PBt ; Qtgt2T (because
QvR
BQw). We conclude that the given data set does not meet the necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for noncooperative-rationalizability in Theorem 3.
Example 2: noncooperative-rationalizable but not cooperative-
rationalizable
We next construct a data set that is noncooperative-rationalizable but not cooperative-
rationalizable. Specically, we consider the following data set S with 4 observations
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We rst demonstrate that this data set is noncooperative-rationalizable. To see this,
























































= Ps;k (s 2 T and k 2
K): Again, it is straightforward to verify that the sets f ~PAt ; Qtgt2T and f ~PBt ; Qtgt2T
both satisfy garp. Therefore, we conclude that the given data set meets the neces-
sary and su¢ cient conditions for noncooperative-rationalizability in Theorem 3.
Next, it can be veried that the given data set does not pass the condition for
consistency with the cooperative model that is given in Proposition 2 of Cherchye,
De Rock and Vermeulen (2007); the reasoning is similar to the one in their Example
1. For brevity, we do not include the argument here, but it can be obtained upon
request. We thus conclude that the given data set violates the necessary and su¢ cient
condition in Theorem 2.
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Table 1: Pass rates and power; cooperative and noncooperative models
Cooperative model (A = B = 1)
Value of  Pass (on total of Power (probability of detecting random behavior)
on 148 households) minimum 1st quartile median 3rd quartile maximum
1:00 137 0.000 0.063 0.087 0.123 0.230
0:90 143 0.000 0.029 0.040 0.056 0.110
0:80 147 0.000 0.011 0.018 0.025 0.056
0:70 147 0.000 0.003 0.007 0.011 0.039
0:60 148 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.018
Noncooperative model (A = B = 0)
Value of  Pass (on total of Power (probability of detecting random behavior)
on 148 households) minimum 1st quartile median 3rd quartile maximum
1:00 137 0.000 0.062 0.087 0.115 0.215
0:90 145 0.000 0.022 0.034 0.045 0.093
0:80 146 0.000 0.009 0.015 0.022 0.048
0:70 147 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.036
0:60 148 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.011
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Table 2: Independence; cooperative and noncooperative models
Rationalizability: not cooperative but noncooperative






Rationalizability: not noncooperative but cooperative







Table 3: Pass rates and power; semicooperative models
Household 1 A 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
B 0 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Power 0.160 0.157 0.154 0.159 0.161 0.168 0.168 0.169 0.169 0.170 0.173
0.1 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Power 0.158 0.157 0.154 0.159 0.161 0.168 0.168 0.169 0.169 0.170 0.173
0.2 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Power 0.157 0.157 0.154 0.159 0.161 0.168 0.168 0.169 0.169 0.170 0.173
0.3 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Power 0.157 0.157 0.154 0.159 0.161 0.168 0.168 0.169 0.169 0.170 0.173
0.4 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Power 0.157 0.157 0.155 0.159 0.161 0.168 0.168 0.169 0.169 0.170 0.173
0.5 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Power 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.158 0.161 0.168 0.168 0.169 0.169 0.170 0.173
0.6 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Power 0.160 0.160 0.160 0.159 0.162 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.170 0.173
0.7 Pass (0/1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.171 0.170 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.170 0.173
0.8 Pass (0/1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.169 0.170 0.173
0.9 Pass (0/1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.169 0.170 0.173
1 Pass (0/1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173
Household 2 A 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
B 0 Pass (0/1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.108 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.100 0.104 0.106 0.103 0.105 0.107 0.108
0.1 Pass (0/1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.108 0.103 0.102 0.102 0.099 0.103 0.105 0.103 0.105 0.107 0.108
0.2 Pass (0/1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.109 0.103 0.101 0.101 0.099 0.103 0.105 0.103 0.105 0.107 0.108
0.3 Pass (0/1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.107 0.104 0.101 0.101 0.099 0.102 0.104 0.103 0.105 0.107 0.108
0.4 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.108 0.107 0.105 0.103 0.101 0.102 0.104 0.103 0.105 0.107 0.108
0.5 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.107 0.107 0.105 0.103 0.101 0.103 0.105 0.104 0.105 0.107 0.108
0.6 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.103 0.103 0.104 0.103 0.101 0.103 0.104 0.104 0.105 0.107 0.108
0.7 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.104 0.104 0.105 0.107 0.108
0.8 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.105 0.106 0.108 0.108
0.9 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.105 0.106 0.108 0.108
1 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108
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